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This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding
model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted
by instances of the seller model (“automated sellers”) maximize the seller’s expected
surplus relative to a heuristic belief function, and arrive stochastically according to an
exponential distribution. Automated buyers are similar. Across experiment sessions
we vary the exponential distribution parameters of automated sellers and buyers in
order to assess the impact of the relative pace of asks and bids on the performance
of both human subjects and the automated sellers and buyers. In these experiments,
prices converge and allocations converge to eﬃciency, yet the split of surplus typically
diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the equilibrium split. In order to evaluate the impact of pace,
a statistical model is developed in which the relative performance of sellers to buyers is
examined as a function of the proﬁle of types present in each experiment session. This
econometric model demonstrates that (1) human buyers outperform human sellers,
(2) automated sellers and buyers with a longer expected time between asks or bids
outperform faster automated sellers and buyers, and (3) the performance of the faster
automated buyers is comparable to that of human buyers.
KEYWORDS: Double auction, experimental economics, bounded rationality
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1 Introduction
Double auction experiments attain competitive equilibrium (CE) allocations and prices for
a wide range of economic environments. Although experiments directly reveal subjects’
behavior and their performance, their decision rules and the impact of these rules on indi-
vidual and aggregate performance are not directly revealed in experiments. Simulations and
analytical models partially overcome this limitation: models specify decision rules, realized
decisions are observed, and outcomes can be compared to aggregate market performance
statistics from experiments, such as eﬃciency, price variability, and relative performance of
sellers and buyers.
Several models of bargaining in the double auction have been formulated in the last
15 years, including Wilson [1987], Friedman [1991], Easley and Ledyard [1993], Gode and
Sunder [1993], and Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998]. Wilson formulates a Bayesian equilibrium
model that extends models of bilateral bargaining to the multilateral bargaining of the
double auction. Friedman models conditions on ﬁnal exchanges in a trading period that
guarantee that ﬁnal trades are in the vicinity of equilibrium prices. Easley and Ledyard
model a process in which sellers update beliefs about asks which will be accepted by buyers
and buyers update beliefs about bids which will be accepted by sellers. Sellers in their model
expect that prices in the current period will be no lower than the minimum of the lowest
ask and lowest trade price in the previous period and no higher than the maximum of the
highest trade price and the highest bid in the previous period. Sellers then randomly select
their asks from this interval. Beliefs and actions of buyers in the Easley-Ledyard model
are identical to those of sellers. Since asks and bids in their model are drawn uniformly
from the price range in the previous period, the interval contracts with positive probability
in each period, and prices therefore converge across periods with replicated supply and
demand conditions. Gode and Sunder do not attempt to model human behavior in the
double auction. Instead, they consider the extreme situation in which sellers and buyers do
not update beliefs or learn from previous market activity, but simply choose an individually
rational ask or bid. Gode and Sunder demonstrate through simulations that even in this
case, allocations are nearly eﬃcient with high probability.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 3
The model by Gjerstad and Dickhaut, like the Easley-Ledyard model, develops a belief
for each seller that his ask will be accepted by some buyer, and also develops a belief for each
buyer that her bid will be accepted by some seller. These beliefs are formed on the basis of
observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids.
Then buyers and sellers choose actions that maximize their own expected surplus. Asks and
bids in this model are submitted at random times, with an exponential distribution that
depends on both the expected surplus of the seller or buyer, and on the time remaining in
the period. We refer to this model as Heuristic Belief Learning (HBL) due to the central role
of the belief formation element of the model. Simulations of this model demonstrate that
the asks by sellers and the bids by buyers lead to eﬃcient outcomes and stable prices, as in
experiments with human subjects. The HBL model of seller and buyer behavior formulated
in Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998] is speciﬁed so that instances of the sellers and buyers can
be embedded into an experiment with human subjects and performance of the sellers and
buyers from the model can be compared directly to human counterparts. This is the premise
of the research reported in this paper.
Interaction between model strategies and human counterparts in experiments simulta-
neously allows researchers to assess the eﬀects of speciﬁc elements of the model of behavior,
as well as the performance of model behavior relative to human behavior. In particular,
when parameters that govern timing distributions for asks and bids by automated sellers
and buyers are varied across experiment sessions, we observe their impact on statistical
aggregates of human behavior and performance, and thereby identify the impact of this
strategic variable. In this paper, a modiﬁed version of the original HBL model is described,
parameters are speciﬁed for the model, and model performance is examined through exper-
iments that involve direct interaction between instances of the model and human subjects.
This approach has two methodological advantages. One advantage is that when automated
sellers and buyers interact with human sellers and buyers, parameters for automated sellers
and buyers can be calibrated so that their performance is similar to that of human sub-
jects. In the experiments reported in this paper, one speciﬁcation of parameter values for
automated sellers and buyers leads to aggregate performance of automated buyers that isTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 4
similar to performance by human buyers. Another advantage of this methodology is that
it expands the types of subject response behaviors that can be measured. Experiments
typically examine behavioral response either to changes in the economic institution or game
form or to changes in the economic environment (preferences, endowments, or production
technologies), but by varying the timing of asks and bids by automated sellers and buyers
we can observe changes in statistical aggregates of human response and performance as a
function of changes to model parameters that aﬀect behavior by instances of the model.
Analysis of data from these experiments clearly shows that prices converge and that
markets converge toward eﬃcient allocations with human subjects, in simulations, and
when automated sellers and buyers interact with human subjects.1 These observations
are consistent with previous double auction experiments and with simulations reported in
Gjerstad and Dickhaut [1998]. Although it has been noted previously that sellers frequently
underperform buyers in double auction experiments – even when the surplus at equilibrium is
equally split between sellers and buyers – this observation has not been quantiﬁed previously.
The magnitude of the diﬀerence between performance of sellers and buyers is surprisingly
large in experiments, in simulations that include a diﬀerence between the pace of asks
and the pace of bids, and in hybrid experiments. Perfect price convergence and perfect
eﬃciency guarantee that surplus is evenly split between sellers and buyers in a symmetric
market (provided that the equilibrium price is unique), but even with low price variability
and small eﬃciency losses, the diﬀerence in relative performance of the two sides of the
market can be large.2 Since the split of surplus between sellers and buyers frequently diﬀers
1 For brevity, throughout this paper a market conducted with human subjects is referred to as an exper-
iment, a market with only automated sellers and buyers is referred to as a simulation, and a market that
combines human subjects and automated sellers or buyers is referred to as a hybrid experiment.
2 If supply and demand are linear and the slope of demand is the negative of the slope of supply, then the
fraction of surplus lost is the square of the fractional diﬀerence of price from the equilibrium price, but the
diﬀerence between the performance of sellers and buyers is approximately four times the fractional diﬀerence
between the price and the equilibrium price. For example, if the price is 10% below the equilibrium price by
(that is, if the price is below the equilibrium price by 10% of the diﬀerence between the equilibrium price and
the price at which supply is zero), then the eﬃciency loss is 1% yet buyers’ earned surplus exceeds sellers’
earned surplus by approximately 40%. This issue is examined in greater detail in Section 4.3.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 5
substantially from an equal split – even when the diﬀerence between the equilibrium price
and the mean realized price is small – it is important to determine which aspects of the
strategic behavior of sellers and buyers lead to the diﬀerence in relative performance. To
address this question, a statistical model is developed which treats the relative performance
of sellers and buyers as a function of the combination of types present in the experimental
design. In order to identify the eﬀect of timing decisions, three types are included on each
side of the market. Seller types employed in the experimental design are human sellers,
slow automated sellers, and fast automated sellers; buyer types are human buyers, slow
automated buyers, and fast automated buyers.3 The analysis shows clearly that the relative
performance of sellers and buyers is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by a diﬀerence between the pace
of asks and the pace of bids, with an advantage to the side of the market that has the slower
pace. Consequently, we conclude that the pace of asks by sellers and the pace of bids by
buyers are important strategic decisions in the temporally unstructured bargaining of the
double auction.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes a description of the economic
environment tested in the experiments, simulations, and hybrid experiments and of the
double auction mechanism. Section 2 also includes a summary of and modiﬁcations to
the Heuristic Belief Learning model of seller of buyer behavior. The experiment design is
described in Section 3. Section 4 provides analysis of experiment results. Conclusions are
drawn in the ﬁnal section.
2 The microeconomic system
Formulation of market experiments is separated into three elements, which correspond to
elements of analysis in the mechanism design literature. In the context of these market
experiments, the elements are (1) the economic environment induced in the experiments,
simulations, and hybrid experiments, (2) the double auction mechanism, and (3) the HBL
3 The designations “slow” and “fast” are relative, not absolute, although in the analysis in Section 4.5
we are able to benchmark performance of each of the two types of automated sellers and the two types of
automated buyers present in simulations and hybrid experiments relative to their human counterparts.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 6
model of behavior. Human behavior is also a factor in experiments and hybrid experiments,
but decision rules employed by human subjects are latent (only the actions that result from
their decision rules are observed), so evaluation of human behavior is included in Section 4
with analysis of experimental data.
2.1 The economic environment
Experiments were conducted with a set I of subjects and HBL model instances partitioned
i n t oas e tIS of sellers and a set IB of buyers, with |IS| = 6 and |IB| = 6. Sellers had a list of
unit costs for either 10, 11, or 12 units of a commodity, and buyers had a list of values for 10,
11, or 12 units of this commodity, as in table 1. A seller incurred the cost for a unit each time
that a trade was negotiated with some buyer and received currency from the buyer equal to
the negotiated price. Each buyer had a currency endowment that was greater than the sum
of her unit values, in order that she could purchase all units for which she had a positive unit
value, if she chose to do so. Each of the twenty-eight experiments and hybrid experiments
reported in this paper had the same basic supply and demand conditions, although there
were four variants on this design that diﬀered by constants which were added to all unit
values and all unit costs. The base design, referred to as ICV2a, is shown on the left side of
ﬁgure 1. Costs for each seller and values for each buyer in this design are shown in table 1.
Units that could be traded proﬁtably at prices in the equilibrium price range [95, 97] are
shown in bold type. A second supply and demand condition, which diﬀers from the ICV2a
design by a shift of 12 to each unit cost and each unit value, is shown on the right side of
ﬁgure 1. The other two versions of the supply and demand schedule used in the experiments,
ICV2c and ICV2d, diﬀered from the ICV2a design by increases of 24 and 40 to all unit costs
and all unit values.
These supply and demand schedules are symmetric with respect to the equilibrium price
pe : for each unit value vi on the demand schedule that yields surplus vi −pe to the buyer if
traded at the equilibrium price, there is a unit cost ci
  on the supply schedule that yields
surplus pe − ci
  = vi − pe if traded at the equilibrium price.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 7
Figure 1: Supply and demand conﬁgurations for ICV2a and ICV2b.
1234567 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2
Sellers 1 & 4 54 66 78 90 102 114 126 138 150 162 174
Sellers 2 & 5 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
Sellers 3 & 6 61 69 77 85 93 101 109 117 125 133 141 149
Buyers 1 & 4 138 126 114 102 90 78 66 54 42 30 18
Buyers 2 & 5 127 122 117 112 107 102 97 92 87 82
Buyers 3 & 6 131 123 115 107 99 91 83 75 67 59 51 43
Table 1: Sellers’ unit cost and buyers’ unit value schedules for ICV2a series.
2.2 The double auction mechanism
The double auction is operationally simple, robustly eﬃcient, and leads to stable transaction
prices. In this mechanism, any seller may submit an ask at any time during a trading period.
An ask is entered in the area labelled “Enter Ask” on the sellers screen display, which is
shown in ﬁgure 2. This ask represents the seller’s current report of the lowest price that
he is willing to accept for a unit of an abstract “commodity.” Similarly, buyers may submit
a bid at any time, which represents the buyer’s current report of the highest price that
she is willing to pay for a unit of the commodity. If an ask is placed that is at or below
the current high bid, a trade results. Similarly, if a bid is placed that meets or exceeds
the current low ask, a trade occurs. Sellers and buyers may make any number of asks or
bids, and may trade any number of units that is consistent with their endowments. SeveralTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 8
Figure 2: Seller screen with elements of market institution.
speciﬁc rules are implemented in the version of the double auction that was used to conduct
the experiments, simulations, and hybrid experiments reported here. Of these, the most
important is the “spread reduction rule,” which requires that each new ask is made at a
value that is below the current low ask and each new bid is placed at a higher value than
the current high bid. Sellers and buyers have the option to remove any ask or bid that they
have previously made, provided the request to remove the ask or bid is received before it
results in a trade. Sellers are permitted a single ask at any given time and any new ask by a
seller replaces his previous ask if he has one in the market queue. Each ask is the unit price
oﬀered by the seller for a single unit: multiple unit trades are not permitted. Similarly,
buyers also are permitted a single bid at any given time and that bid is for one unit.
Throughout each trading period, a queue on the screen of each seller displays all current
asks and all current bids (shown as the “Market Queue” in ﬁgure 2); the screen of each buyerTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 9
also displays both queues. When a seller successfully enters an ask into the ask queue, he
receives a conﬁrmation message in the “Messages” area of the screen display. Similarly, a
buyer receives a conﬁrmation message when she enters a bid into the bid queue. When a
seller and buyer complete a trade, they both receive a conﬁrmation message, and the trade
price is included on a graphical display of all trade prices from the current period, shown
as the “Market Transaction Prices” graph. The length of each trading period was known
to each seller and to each buyer, and a clock on the screen of each seller and buyer showed
the time remaining in the period. Each of these elements of the market institution appears
on a seller’s trading screen, as shown in ﬁgure 2. Buyers have a similar trading screen.
Operations of these elements of the double auction mechanism are explained to subjects in
a detailed interactive instruction set.
2.3 Heuristic Belief Learning
Each seller in the HBL model forms a belief that his ask will be accepted by some buyer;
similarly, each buyer forms a belief that her bid will be accepted by some seller. These beliefs
are formed on the basis of observed market activity, including frequencies of asks, bids,
accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then each seller chooses an ask and each buyer chooses a
bid that maximizes his or her own expected surplus. This model converges quickly to eﬃcient
allocations, with stable transaction prices. In the conclusions of their paper, Gjerstad and
Dickhaut report two diﬀerences between simulation data and data from experiments. One
reported diﬀerence between the HBL model and human behavior is that in the model asks
by sellers and bids by buyers are made initially at values that are closer to equilibrium than
those of human subjects (that is, in the HBL model initial asks are too low and initial bids
are too high). The other observed diﬀerence is that once the low ask reaches recent trade
prices, the probability of another ask remains close to one half, whereas most human sellers
are much more reluctant to decrease their ask once the low ask reaches recent trade prices.
This has the consequence that in the HBL model, trades are frequently initiated by sellers
at prices below the average of recent prices. Analogous behaviors by buyers in the HBL
model are observed: buyers’ bids are increased too frequently after the high bid reaches theTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 10
average of recent trade prices. After a summary of the HBL model, these two diﬀerences
are described in more detail, and two modiﬁcations are described which mitigate the eﬀects
of these diﬀerences between the behavior speciﬁed in the model and human behavior.
2.3.1 Elements of the Heuristic Belief Learning model
An action by a seller or buyer in the HBL model has three primary elements: a heuristic
belief function, maximization of expected surplus relative to this belief, and a choice of
the timing of an ask or bid. The heuristic belief function is based on a transformation
of empirical acceptance frequencies for asks and bids. We begin with a description of
these empirical acceptance frequencies, develop heuristic belief functions based on these
acceptance frequencies, and then describe expected surplus maximization and the timing of
sellers’ asks and buyers’ bids.
Empirical acceptance frequencies
A seller’s heuristic belief function is based on empirical acceptance frequencies for asks
within the seller’s memory. For each ask a that has occurred within the history maintained
by the seller, the empirical acceptance frequency for a is deﬁned as the number of acceptances
of asks at a, divided by the number of asks that have been placed at a.L e tA(a) denote the
number of asks that have been made at a,a n dl e tTA(a) denote the number of those asks






The empirical acceptance frequency function for a buyer is similar. Let B(b) be the bids at






Figure 3 shows both the frequencies of bids (as the solid line) and of accepted bids (as
the dashed line) in intervals of width 5 from 50 to 100 during period 1 of the experiment
ICV2a-DA-010606b. This experiment has the supply and demand shown on the left side of
ﬁgure 1, which has an equilibrium price range pe =[ 9 5 ,97]. The mean price during period 1
was 92.8, and half of the bids in the interval [91,95] were accepted.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 11








Figure 3: Bids and accepted bids in period 1 of experiment ICV2a-DA-010606b.
There are several problems that are encountered in an eﬀort to use the empirical fre-
quency function ˇ qi(b) as the belief function for a buyer. The large action set for buyers
combined with the small number of data points after a small number of bids produces an
irregular belief function. In the example in ﬁgure 3, after 29 bids there are intervals on
which ˇ qi(b) is undeﬁned (even when bids are clustered into intervals of width 5), and on
intervals where the empirical belief function is deﬁned, it is not monotonic. This is undesir-
able because a seller is more likely to accept a higher bid, so a buyer’s belief function should
be monotonically increasing. Similar considerations apply to the empirical acceptance fre-
quency function of each seller.4
Heuristic belief functions
In order to address these issues, the data that generate a seller’s empirical frequency
function ˇ pi(a) and a buyer’s empirical frequency function ˇ qi(b) are transformed into heuristic
belief functions   pi(a)a n d  qi(b) which are monotonic, and are deﬁned for any number of asks,
bids, and trades. This construction consists of four steps.
4 Beliefs and decision rules of sellers and buyers in the HBL model are symmetric. There are several
instances throughout this paper where a description of a seller’s (a buyer’s) belief, ask, or a property of his
belief function or ask (her belief function or bid) is provided. In each of these cases there is an analogous
statement for the opposite side of the market that is mentioned, but repetition of the symmetric argument
is frequently less detailed when the analogous argument is obvious.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 12
Step 1 In the ﬁrst step, the initial belief is deﬁned. Let Mi be an upper bound on
the range for the belief of agent i ∈I .B u y e ri ∈I B believes that a bid at zero will be
accepted with probability zero and a bid at or above Mi will be accepted with probability
one; seller i ∈I S believes that an ask at zero will be accepted with probability one and
an ask at Mi will be accepted with probability zero.
In simulations and hybrid experiments, for sellers Mi ≡ 22+[log2(max{ci})]. For buyers,
Mi ≡ 21+[log2(max{vi})] where [log2(max{vi})] is the greatest integer less than or equal
to log2(max{vi}).
Step 2 Each agent i ∈Ihas ﬁnite memory length mi. Each new ask is adjoined to a
set A of asks that have previously occurred; each new bid is adjoined to a set of bids B.
Deﬁne Ami ⊆Aas the set of asks that have been made during the negotiations leading
to the last mi trades. Deﬁne Bmi ⊆Bsimilarly and let Dm,i ≡A mi ∪B mi ∪{ 0,M i}.













where TA(·)a n dB(·) are as deﬁned in the description of the empirical acceptance fre-
quencies and RA(d) ≡ A(d) − TA(d) counts rejected asks at d. Similarly, the belief of













The rationale for the deﬁnition of a seller’s belief function   pi(a)i st h a ta n ya s ka to r
above a that has been accepted should reinforce the seller’s belief that an ask at a will
be accepted, as should any bid at or above a that has been made. Any ask at a value at
or below a that has not been accepted should decrease the seller’s belief that a will be
accepted. The rationale for the deﬁnition of a buyer’s belief function   qi(b) is analogous.
Step 3 In markets that include the spread reduction rule, which requires that any new
ask is placed at a value below the current low ask (or ‘standing ask’) sa a n da n yn e wb i d
is above the current high bid sb, beliefs are modiﬁed to account for this restriction. This
is accomplished by setting   pi(d) = 0 for all d ≥ sa and setting   qi(d) = 0 for all d ≤ sb.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 13
Step 4 The beliefs   pi(a)a n d  qi(b) are extended from Dm,i to [0,M i]b yc u b i cs p l i n e
interpolation. For each dk ∈D m,i,d e ﬁ n epi(a)o n[ dk,d k+1)b y
pi(a)=β0 + β1 a + β2 a2 + β3 a3,
where four conditions uniquely determine the coeﬃcients (β0,β 1,β 2,β 3) on the interval
[dk,d k+1). These conditions are pi(dk)=  pi(dk), pi(dk+1)=  pi(dk+1), p
 
i(dk) = 0, and
p
 
i(dk+1) = 0. The extension of beliefs   qi(b) for buyer i to [0,M i] is identical.
With this deﬁnition, Gjerstad and Dickhaut show that each seller’s belief function pi(a)i s
monotonically decreasing, and each buyer’s belief function qi(b) is monotonically increasing.
Figure 4 shows a buyer’s belief at the end of period 1 from experiment ICV2a-DA-010606b.
In the simulations and hybrid experiments reported in Section 4, beliefs of the automated
sellers and buyers are formed using the history of asks and bids that lead up to the last
12 trades (m = 12). The heuristic belief function qi(b) in ﬁgure 4 should be compared to
the empirical belief function ˇ qi(b) in ﬁgure 3, since the motivation for the deﬁnition of the
heuristic belief function is to develop a transformation of the data from the empirical belief
function into a monotonic function.
Figure 4: Buyer’s belief at end of period 1 in experiment ICV2a-DA-010606b.
Expected surplus maximization
For the belief function pi(a), the expected surplus that seller i with unit cost ci attains
when he places an ask a is E[Si(a)] = (a − ci)pi(a). The expected surplus maximizing ask
for this seller is a∗
i =a r g m a x E[Si(a)]. At this expected surplus maximizing ask a∗
i, theTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 14




i). The expected surplus function, the
expected surplus maximizing bid, and the maximum expected surplus for each buyer i ∈I B
is deﬁned similarly.
Timing of asks and bids
Asks and bids are made at random times by sellers and buyers in the HBL model, ac-
cording to exponential distributions. Assume that a total of κ−1 asks or bids have occurred
in a trading period and the times of these events are {t1,t 2,t 3,...,t κ−1}. Immediately af-
ter the ask or bid at time tκ−1, each agent i ∈Icalculates a time tκi to wait until his next
ask or bid. For each agent i ∈I , the probability distribution for the wait time tκi is
Pr[tκi <t κ−1 + τ]=1− e−τ/λi. (1)
The parameter λi depends on the buyer’s current maximum expected surplus S∗
i , on the
current time tκ−1 that has elapsed in the trading period, and on the total time T in the
trading period. With this speciﬁcation of the wait time for each agent, Pr[tκi <t κ−1]=0 ,
and the wait time until the next ask or bid is tκ =m i n {tκi}i∈I.
The speciﬁcation of λi(Si,t κ−1,T) in the HBL model is
λi(S∗
i ,t κ−1,T)=
βi (T − αi tκ−1)
Si T
(2)
where αi ∈ (0, 1), βi ∈ (0, ∞), and S∗
i is the maximum expected surplus for agent i.
For λi(·) as speciﬁed in equation (2), the mean time until agent i with the CDF in
equation (1) places his ask or bid is λi. The mean time decreases in S∗
i : agents with greater
maximum expected surplus are more anxious to trade. The parameter βi is a linear scale
factor for the timing decision. Parameters {βi}i∈I are varied across experiment sessions in
order to determine the eﬀect of timing decisions on performance.5 The factor αi, which is
multiplied by the current elapsed time in the trading period, aﬀects the extent to which
the pace of a seller’s asks or a buyer’s bid increases as the period progresses. When t =0 ,
(T−αi t)
T =1 ,a n da st → T,
(T−αi t)
T → 1 − αi. Surplus on units sold late in the trading
period is typically much lower than it is early in the trading period. The factor
(T−αt)
T
5 In hybrid experiments, all parameters {βi}i∈I are either βi = 250 (“fast”) or βi = 400 (“slow”).
Simulations were conducted with slow sellers and slow buyers, with slow sellers and fast buyers, and with
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balances the eﬀect of this diﬀerence by increasing the pace as the period progresses. In both
the simulations and the hybrid experiments reported in Section 4, the value of α is 0.95.
2.3.2 Model modiﬁcations
Two aspects of the behavior of buyers and sellers in the model diﬀer from human behavior
and two modiﬁcations to the model have been developed that mitigate these two diﬀerences
and thereby improve model performance. Sellers in the HBL model typically make initial
asks near recent prices and subsequently they frequently place asks below recent prices.
These two aspects of seller behavior in the model frequently result in prices proposed by
sellers that are below the average of recent prices. In experiments (that is, in markets with
only human subjects), a price below the average of recent prices typically occurs when a seller
accepts a buyer’s bid that was below the average of recent prices. Analogous diﬀerences
between bids by buyers in the HBL model and bids by human buyers are observed. To
summarize, in experiments trades at prices above the mean of recent prices are typically
initiated by sellers and trades at prices below the mean of recent prices are typically initiated
by buyers, whereas this pattern is reversed in the HBL model. Consequently, if we consider
the diﬀerence ¯ pa − ¯ pb, where ¯ pa is the mean price for trades initiated by sellers and ¯ pb is the
mean price for trades initiated by buyers, this diﬀerence is typically positive in experiments,
and it is typically negative in simulations of the HBL model. Following the description of
the modiﬁcations, we assess the eﬀectiveness of the modiﬁcations by comparing values of
¯ pa − ¯ pb in the original HBL model, the modiﬁed HBL model, and experiments.
Modiﬁcation to decision rule
Human buyers realize that a bid below equilibrium can be made at low cost, since bids
can be replaced. Consequently, human buyers frequently make bids below recent trade
prices, and bids progress up toward recent trade prices. Figure 3 in Section 2.3.1 shows
all bids in period 1 of experiment ICV2a-DA-010606b. Twenty-three of twenty-nine bids
were below the average price during the period shown in the ﬁgure (and only four of those
twenty-three bids were accpeted). Five of the six bids placed at values above the mean
price were accepted. From the ﬁgure, we see that human subjects frequently place bidsTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 16
that are below prices where trades have occurred. In the HBL model, a buyer’s belief qi(b)
represents the buyer’s assessment of the probability that a given bid will be accepted by
some seller. Maximization of expected surplus relative to this belief is too aggressive, in
the sense that it ignores the option to replace bids that are not accepted. Formulation of a
continuation value for the decision problem would be desirable, but a number of obstacles
present themselves. Among these obstacles are the non-stationarity of beliefs, the fact that
buyers typically purchase multiple units, and the unknown number of bidding opportunities
that a buyer will have in a trading period. If none of these problems were present, a buyer
with n remaining opportunities to place a bid b would have the continuation value
E[Si(b)] = (v − b){q(b)+( 1− q(b))q(b)+···+( 1− q(b))n−1 q(b)}
=( v − b)(1− (1 − q(b))n). (3)
The aspect of model performance that motivates this change to the decision rule is that
initial asks are too close to recent prices. The change to the decision rule should lead to a
decrease in the expected surplus maximizing bid for the modiﬁed decision rule. Proposition 1
shows that the bid that maximizes expected surplus is lower when the surplus function is
˜ Si(b)=( v − b)q(b)1/n, and we have tested the model with this modiﬁcation.6
Proposition 1 Let b∗
k be the argmax of S(b)=( v−b)q(b)o n[ dk,d k+1), and let ˜ b∗
k be the
argmax of ˜ S(b)=( v −b)q(b)
1
n. Then (1) on each interval [dk,d k+1) the argmax ˜ b∗
k of ˜ S(b)
is less than the argmax b∗
k of S(b), and (2) if ˜ S(˜ b∗




Proof The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Assertion (1) in the proposition states that the local argmax of ˜ S(b)o ne a c hi n t e r v a l
[dk,d k+1) is less than the local argmax of S(b). Assertion (2) guarantees that the global
argmax of ˜ S(b) lies in either the same interval [dk,d k+1) as the global argmax of S(b), or it
lies in an interval to the left of the one where the global argmax of S(b) occurs. Consequently,
˜ b∗ <b ∗.
6 The function ˜ S(b) has been used as the alternative objective function. This form for the objective was
selected based on an attempt to employ an alternative to the myopic expected surplus function prior to
formulation of the continuation value argument described above and characterized in equation (3).THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 17
Modiﬁcation to timing
The second problem with the model is that bids frequently exceed recent prices. This has
also been addressed with a simple modiﬁcation: when current maximum expected surplus
for a buyer exceeds the expected surplus that the buyer would attain at the average of recent
prices, we decrease the expected time until the buyer submits another bid. In the modiﬁed
deﬁnition of the random variable that governs the timing of bids, let ¯ pm be the average price
over the last m trades, and let ¯ Si ≡ max{0,E[Si(¯ pm)]} =m a x {0,(vi − ¯ pm)q(¯ pm)}. The
timing modiﬁcation is implemented by taking the ratio of expected surplus at the average
price ¯ Si divided by the current maximum expected surplus S∗
i for the buyer, and raising
this ratio to a positive power c. The modiﬁed speciﬁcation of λi(S∗
i ,t κ−1,T)i s
˜ λi(S∗











, if ¯ Si > 0,
βi (T−αi tκ−1)
S∗
i T , if ¯ Si ≤ 0,
(4)
where αi ∈ (0, 1), βi > 0, and S∗
i is the maximum expected surplus of agent i.
If the current standing ask sa is less than ¯ pm then a bid b = sa results in a trade with
probability one, so S∗
i ≥ v − sa > v − ¯ pm ≥ (v − ¯ pm)q(¯ pm)=¯ Si. Consequently ˜ λi <λ i :
the mean time until a bid decreases when the low ask is below the mean of recent prices.
Assessment of modiﬁcations
The two observations about human behavior described above lead to a diﬀerence between
the mean price of trades initiated by sellers (¯ pa) and the mean price for trades initiated by
buyers (¯ pb). This is because asks by human sellers are typically decreased to values just
above or at the mean of recent trades, and bids by human buyers are increased to prices just
below or at the mean of recent trade prices. A trade between a human seller and human
buyer typically occurs when either the buyer accepts the seller’s ask (which is typically
no lower than the mean of recent trade prices) or a seller accepts the buyer’s bid (which,
similarly, is typically no higher than the mean of recent trade prices). Consequently, on
average trades between human sellers and human buyers that are initiated by sellers occur
at higher prices than trades initiated by buyers.
As a result of bids that frequently exceed recent prices and asks below recent prices (as
described in the ﬁrst paragraph of Section 2.3.2), this statistic is reversed in the model. TheTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 18
c =0 c =3 c =5 c =7 c =8
Myopic objective -2.29 -1.21 -0.89 -1.02 -1.04
Modiﬁed objective -1.44 -0.45 -0.27 -0.15 -0.04
Table 2: Diﬀerence between sellers’ and buyers’ accepted price proposals (¯ pa − ¯ pb).
two modiﬁcations above are intended to address this problem. Examination of the price
diﬀerence between trades initiated by sellers and those initiated by buyers gives a measure
of the extent to which the issue has been resolved. Table 2 shows the eﬀects of these
two modiﬁcations on the diﬀerence between prices initiated by sellers and those initiated
by buyers for groups of ten simulations in each of the ten cells of the table. In all cells
except the two with c = 7 and c = 8 and the modiﬁed objective, it is possible to reject
the hypothesis that the mean diﬀerence is positive. Across ﬁve experiments with human
subjects the mean of this statistic was 0.45, and for this sample it is not possible to reject
the hypothesis that the mean diﬀerence is positive. It is clear from this table that the model
mimics this aspect of human behavior more eﬀectively as a result of the combination of the
modiﬁcations described above, and that either of these two modiﬁcations independently
does not resolve this discrepancy between model and human performance.
3 Experiment design
The economic environment, described in Section 2.1, consists of six buyers and six sellers.
There are three schedules of unit costs for sellers, with schedule 1 assigned to sellers 1
and 4, schedule 2 assigned to sellers 2 and 5, and schedule 3 assigned to sellers 3 and 6.
Buyers also have three schedules, assigned similarly. This was done so that in “balanced”
hybrid experiments – which include human sellers, automated sellers, human buyers, and
automated buyers – there are human seller and automated seller counterparts in the market
that have identical cost schedules and there are also human buyer and automated buyer
counterparts in the market with identical value schedules.
The experiment design includes two factors. These are the fraction of human sellers andTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 19
the fraction of human buyers, and the pace of asks by the automated sellers and the pace of
bids by automated buyers. The fraction of agents is varied by implementing two conditions.
In one condition, referred to as balanced, half of the buyers and half of the sellers were
instances of the modiﬁed HBL model, and the other half on each side of the market were
human subjects. In the “unbalanced” condition, either all of the buyers or all of the sellers
were HBL model instances and human subjects ﬁlled all roles on the side of the market
opposite the HBL model. This is represented in ﬁgure 5, where the horizontal axis is the
percentage of human buyers, and the vertical axis is the percentage of human sellers. The
origin represents 30 simulations (no human buyers or sellers). The upper right represents
ﬁve baseline (all human) experiments. The fourteen observations in the center (ten with
slow buyers and four with faster buyers, as explained below) are the balanced condition.
The nine oﬀ-diagonal observations are the two unbalanced conditions, which are also split




















Figure 5: Design for human-model interaction experiments.
For the second treatment variable, we varied the parameters {βi}i∈I that govern the
pace at which sellers and buyers in the model submit their asks and bids. The model speci-
ﬁes that asks by sellers and bids by buyers are submitted randomly according to exponential
distributions with the parameters {˜ λi}i∈I in equation (4). Two values of the linear param-
eters βi in that equation were tested. These were slow automated sellers and buyers with
βi = 400 and fast automated sellers and buyers with βi = 250. Since sellers’ beliefs after
several periods are approximately p(a)=1f o ra at the equilibrium, and since the diﬀerenceTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 20
between the equilibrium price and the lowest cost is 42 for seller 1, the value of ˜ λ1 for seller 1
with βi = 400 is approximately 9.52 seconds in early periods, which is the expected length
of time into a new period when seller 1 places his ﬁrst ask. Since seller 1 and buyer 1 have
symmetric costs and values, buyer 1 also has an expected wait time of 9.52 seconds under
these assumptions. When βi = 250, the expected time until the ﬁrst ask by seller 1 or the
ﬁrst bid by buyer 1 is approximately 5.95 seconds if p(a) = 1 at the equilibrium price.
The HBL model speciﬁes the length of time that each seller will wait before he places
an ask, and it also speciﬁes the length of time that each buyer will wait before she places
her bid. Once a new ask or bid arrives, each seller recalculates his new expected surplus
maximizing ask, as well as the length of time that he will wait. Similarly, each buyer
calculates a new bid and wait time. The realized ask or bid is the minimum over all sellers
and buyers of these wait times. In order to compare the expected or realized length of
time between messages from the HBL model to the observed time between messages from
experiments, we consider the minimum wait time among instances of the HBL model. The
minimum of n independent exponential random variables with parameters {˜ λi}i∈I is an





. For the costs and values in
table 1, at the beginning of each period, if beliefs are focused at the equilibrium for both
sides of the market and βi = 400, ˜ λ = 1
1.08 so the mean time until the ﬁrst ask or bid is
approximately 0.926 second. In the ﬁve baseline experiments, periods 6−15, the mean time
until the ﬁrst bid was 0.921 second.
A more detailed comparison between the timing decisions of human subjects and the
timing actions for the HBL model could be carried out by examining what each instance of
the HBL model would do at each point in time during an experiment, where the data (asks,
bids, acceptances, and the timing of these actions) is fed to the instances of the model from
the data generated by human subjects in experiments. The brief comparison above follows
this method for the beginning of each trading period, under the assumption that beliefs
are focused on the equilibrium value in periods 6 − 10. In this limited case, and under this
assumption about belief functions, the mean time until the ﬁrst ask or bid from an instance
of the HBL model is similar to the mean time until the ﬁrst ask or bid by a human subject.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 21
Design matrix
Table 3 summarizes the experiment design. Each row indicates a speciﬁc treatment
(that is, the number of groups of automated sellers and buyers, including their pace, and
the number of groups of human sellers and buyers), and the number of experiment sessions or
simulations for the speciﬁed treatment. As described in Section 2.1, there are two identical
sets of seller parameters and two identical sets of buyer parameters. The numbers in columns
two through four indicate the number of buyer sets of each type and the numbers in columns
ﬁve through seven indicate the number of seller sets of each type. Since there are six buyers
and six sellers in each market, with two identical sets of buyers and two identical sets of
sellers, the numbers in columns two through four sum to two in each row, as do the entries
in columns ﬁve through seven. Rows in table 3 represent the same data as ﬁgure 5: numbers
of sessions in each row correspond to the numbers of sessions in the ﬁgure from top left to
bottom right.
Slow Fast Slow Fast
Number of Human automated automated Human automated automated
sessions buyers buyers buyers sellers sellers sellers
2 02 020 0
2 00 220 0
5 20 020 0
10 11 011 0
4 10 110 1
10 02 002 0
10 02 000 2
10 00 202 0
3 20 002 0
2 20 000 2
Table 3: Experiment design matrix with number of sessions.
The rank of the design matrix is four, so in the regressions of Section 4.5, estimates of
the contribution of each of the types to the relative performance of sellers and buyers are
done with pairwise comparisons ﬁrst between human subjects and slow automated sellers
and buyers, and then between human subjects and fast automated sellers and buyers.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 22
4 Analysis
As in previous analyses of double auction simulations and experiments, approximate price
convergence and convergence of allocation to eﬃcient outcomes both occur in the experi-
ments, hybrid experiments, and simulations. In view of this convergence, it is surprising
though that there are frequently large diﬀerences between the ratio of sellers’ realized surplus
earnings (as a fraction of their equilibrium surplus) to the buyers’ realized surplus earnings
(again, as a fraction of their equilibrium surplus).7 Moreover, the diﬀerence between an
individual seller’s earnings and his equilibrium earnings is highly correlated with the diﬀer-
ence between the earnings of other sellers and their equilibrium earnings. This correlation
justiﬁes a statistical model in which the relative performance sellers and buyers is modelled
as a function of the seller and buyer types present in each experiment session. The main
result of the paper is established through this performance analysis by regressing the rela-
tive performance of sellers to buyers in each session on the composition of types present in
the session, where these types are human human buyers, slow automated buyers (βi = 400),
fast automated buyers (βi = 250), human sellers, slow automated sellers (βi = 400), and
fast automated sellers (βi = 250). This analysis establishes several facts: (1) performance of
automated sellers and automated buyers is similar, (2) slow automated buyers outperform
human buyers, (3) human buyers outperform human sellers, and (4) performance of fast
automated buyers is similar to human buyers. The last of these observations is fortuitous,
because it allows us to draw one other important conclusion: since performance of fast au-
tomated buyers is comparable to performance of human buyers, and since slow automated
buyers outperform human buyers, we can conclude that at least locally in the vicinity of the
pace of human buyers, buyer performance is enhanced by a reduction to the pace of bids.
The remainder of this section details these arguments by ﬁrst establishing, in Section 4.1,
convergence of prices and then, in Section 4.2, convergence to eﬃcient allocations. Following
the sections on convergence, an analysis is developed in Section 4.3 that establishes that
relative surplus diﬀerences between sellers and buyers can be substantially larger than eﬃ-
7 In particular, if the price standard deviation is zero and the market is eﬃcient, then the surplus split
between sellers and buyers would be the equilibrium split if the equilibrium price is unique.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 23
ciency losses. Section 4.4 demonstrates the strong relationship between an individual seller’s
performance and the performance of all other sellers. A similar regression is performed to
establish that the same result holds for buyers. The main result of the paper is established
in Section 4.5, where the relative performance of sellers to buyers is examined as a function
of the types present in an individual experiment session.
4.1 Price convergence
Let sn be the standard deviation of price in period n. Price convergence is examined by
estimating a model of the form s(n)=an−b. This can be expressed as a linear model of
the form lns(n)=l na − blnn +  n. For this model, the estimate of a represents the initial
level of variability of transaction price, and the estimate of b represents the rate at which
prices converge.
Treatment ˆ a ˆ bR 2 F ˆ s(15)
Simulation (original) 4.083 0.086 0.030 4.546 3.23
Simulation (modiﬁed) 2.195 0.181 0.092 14.94 1.34
Balanced (slow) 4.215 0.508 0.420 107.3 1.06
Balanced (fast) 4.995 0.525 0.523 63.7 1.21
Unbalanced (automated buyers) 5.357 0.489 0.250 19.29 1.42
Unbalanced (automated sellers) 4.670 0.581 0.420 52.78 0.97
Baseline (all human) 13.019 0.928 0.638 128.5 1.05
Table 4: Price convergence in simulations, hybrid experiments, and experiments.
Results of regressions with this model, pooled across simulations, hybrid experiments,
and experiments, are summarized in table 4. There are several patterns that are readily
apparent from the regression results. First, both the original HBL model and the modiﬁed
HBL model converge much faster in simulations than human subjects do in experiments.
Moreover, there is much less reduction in variability across periods in these simulations
than there is in experiments. Finally, each of the hybrid experiments has both estimates
ˆ a and ˆ b that are between those of the experiments and those with human subjects. OfTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 24
primary importance though is the fact that prices are very stable after several periods in
simulations, in hybrid experiments, and in experiments, as measured by ˆ s(15), the estimate
of price variability in the ﬁnal period.
4.2 Eﬃciency
Eﬃciency can also be modelled with exponential convergence. If the eﬃciency level in
period n is e(n), and if the rate at which foregone surplus reduces is exponential in the
number of periods that have elapsed, then 1 − e(n)=an−b. For this model, signiﬁcant
convergence trends occur in both the hybrid experiments and the experiments. Simulations
do not demonstrate a trend of convergence to eﬃciency, yet the initial eﬃciency level, which
is approximately 99.4%, is similar to the ﬁgure that is attained in hybrid experiments and
experiments by period 15, ˆ e(15).
Treatment ˆ a ˆ bR 2 F ˆ e(15)
Simulation (original) 0.0059 -0.0297 0.0021 0.317 0.9936
Simulation (modiﬁed) 0.0057 0.0201 0.0005 0.074 0.9946
Balanced (slow) 0.0377 0.7575 0.2594 41.3 0.9952
Balanced (fast) 0.0847 1.2624 0.5499 70.8 0.9972
Unbalanced (automated buyers) 0.0165 0.6325 0.1921 13.7 0.9970
Unbalanced (automated sellers) 0.0877 1.0552 0.3569 40.5 0.9950
Baseline (all human) 0.0686 0.7806 0.3251 35.2 0.9917
Table 5: Eﬃciency in simulations, hybrid experiments, and experiments.
4.3 Surplus split
Theoretical analysis
The mean price in experiments and hybrid experiments typically diﬀers from the equi-
librium price, and this diﬀerence leads to large diﬀerences in the relative performance of
buyers and sellers. Nevertheless, the surplus loss in these markets is typically very small.
We examine two benchmark cases, which are depicted in ﬁgure 6, to demonstrate that theTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 25
measure of convergence typically used in market experiments does not imply an equal divi-
sion of surplus. Analyses for these two cases are both based on the assumptions that supply
and demand are both linear, and the slope of demand is the negative of the slope of supply.
Figure 6: Surplus losses and earnings diﬀerences at non-equilibrium prices.
In the ﬁrst benchmark case, shown on the left side of ﬁgure 6, all trades occur at a
single price (price variability is zero), and eﬃciency is high, yet the split of surplus is highly
uneven. Speciﬁcally, when all trades occur at a single price p(α)=αp 1 +( 1− α)pe, where
S(p1) = 0, then the fraction of surplus lost is only α2, but the ratio of surplus earned by
buyers to surplus earned by sellers is R1(α)=1+4 α
1−α. In the other benchmark case,
shown on the right side of ﬁgure 6, there is complete eﬃciency, yet even with low price
variability, the split of surplus is also uneven. In this case, all trades occur at a single
price p(α) until the supply is exhausted at that price, and subsequent trades – for prices
p ∈ (p(α),p e) – occur at prices p along the supply schedule. In this case, we ﬁnd that the
price standard deviation, normalized by the range from the highest value to the lowest cost,
is approximately 1/7 the value of α. Yet the ratio of buyer to seller surplus in this case is
R2(α)=
(2−(1−α)2)
(1−α)2 , which is even greater than in the ﬁrst benchmark case.
For example, if the fractional diﬀerence of the price from equilibrium is α =0 .07, then
the surplus loss is only 0.49% in the ﬁrst benchmark case (shown as the shaded triangle),
but the ratio of buyers’ surplus to sellers’ surplus is 1.301. In the second benchmark case,
with α =0 .07 the normalized price variability is 0.52% and the ratio of buyers’ to sellers’THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 26
s u r p l u si s1 .312. This observation has important consequences for the interpretation of
the results of market experiments. Since large diﬀerences in earnings are typical, and are
consistent with both price stability and high eﬃciency, strategic interactions between sellers
and buyers play a more important role in competitive markets than we have realized.
Table 6 shows the theoretical surplus split as a function of price diﬀerences from equi-
librium for the ICV2 design used in the experiments, hybrid experiments, and simulations.
The surplus split and eﬃciency calculations in the table are made under the assumptions
that all trades take place at a single price, and all trades occur that increase or at least
leave constant the surplus of both seller and buyer, i.e., under the assumptions of the ﬁrst
benchmark case above.
Buyer Seller Total Surplus
p(α) − pe Surplus Surplus Surplus Ratio (eB/eS)l n ( eB/eS) Eﬃciency
4 476 720 1196 0.661 -0.414 98.7%
3 504 704 1208 0.716 -0.334 99.7%
2 534 674 1208 0.792 -0.233 99.7%
1 574 638 1212 0.900 -0.106 100.0%
0 606 606 1212 1.000 0.000 100.0%
-1 638 574 1212 1.111 0.106 100.0%
-2 674 534 1208 1.262 0.232 99.7%
-3 704 504 1208 1.397 0.334 99.7%
-4 720 476 1196 1.513 0.414 98.7%
Table 6: Surplus and eﬃciency as a function of price deviation from equilibrium.
Realized split
Figure 7 shows the natural logarithm of the ratio of buyers’ to sellers’ surplus as a
function of the diﬀerence between the average transaction price and the equilibrium price
for three types of simulations. The triangles on the upper left show the observations from 10
simulations with fast sellers (βi = 250 for i ∈I S) and slow buyers (βi = 400 for i ∈I B). The
10 squares in the center of the ﬁgure are from simulations with slow buyers and slow sellers.
The remaining 10 observations are from simulations with fast buyers and slow sellers.
While there is some variability of relative performance in these simulations within eachTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 27
p(α) − pe
ln(eB/eS)
– Slow buyers vs. fast sellers
– Slow buyers vs. slow sellers
– Fast buyers vs. slow sellers







Figure 7: Surplus ratio and price diﬀerence from equilibrium in simulations.
group of simulations, a diﬀerence between the pace of asks and bids has a pronounced eﬀect
on the relative performance of sellers and buyers. This pattern is also present in hybrid
experiments, as shown in ﬁgure 8. As in ﬁgure 7, there are three types of data shown in
ﬁgure 8. Hybrid experiments with human sellers and automated buyers are shown with
upward triangles, each of which is in the quadrant with a positive value for ln(SB/SS)a n da
negative value of p(α) − pe. Hybrid experiments with human sellers and automated buyers
are shown with downward triangles, each of which is in the quadrant with a negative value
for ln(SB/SS) and a positive value of p(α)−pe. Balanced hybrid experiments are shown as
squares: of these 13 are in the upper left and one is in the lower right quadrant.
Finally, ﬁgure 9 shows the relationship between the ratio of buyers’ to sellers’ surplus
from ﬁve experiments. In the experiments, there is also a tendency for sellers to underper-
form buyers. Performance ratio statistics from experiments and hybrid experiments do not
have the degree of regularity observed in the simulations of ﬁgure 7, yet there is a consistent
pattern between each of the six types employed in the experiment design (human buyers
and sellers, slow automated buyers and sellers, and fast automated buyers and sellers) and
the division of surplus between buyers and sellers.
Automated sellers and automated buyers have equal bargaining capability since they areTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 28
p(α) − pe
ln(eB/eS)
– Automated buyers vs. human sellers
– ‘Balanced’ treatment
– Human buyers vs. automated sellers







Figure 8: Surplus ratio and price diﬀerence in hybrid experiments.
speciﬁed symmetrically, but as ﬁgure 7 shows, slow automated sellers have an advantage over
fast automated buyers and vice versa. In addition, both automated sellers and automated
buyers outperform humans. The third pattern is that human buyers outperform human
sellers. In order to demonstrate these patterns of relative performance, a statistical model
is developed that regresses the performance of sellers versus buyers on the types present
in each experiment. Coeﬃcients for each type are then interpreted as contributions to the
performance of sellers relative to buyers in an experiment. In order to carry out statistical
analysis that treats the performance of sellers relative to buyers as a function of the types
present in each experiment, it is important to demonstrate that the performance of sellers
is positively correlated with one another, as is the performance of buyers. High correlation
of performance within each side of the market justiﬁes statistical analysis in which the
performance of each side of the market is modelled as dependent on the proﬁle of types (e.g.,
slow automated sellers, fast automated sellers, and human sellers) present in an experiment.
The next subsection demonstrates the high positive correlation of performance among sellers
and among buyers.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 29
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Figure 9: Surplus ratio and price diﬀerences in experiments.
4.4 Correlation
The performance of sellers and of buyers, when plotted across trading periods, exhibits a
high degree of correlation. Figure 10 shows the performance of three automated buyers and
three automated sellers across 15 periods of the hybrid experiment ICV2a-DA-020330b1.
In the ﬁrst period, and from periods 5 through 15, each of the three automated buyers had
earnings that exceeded their equilibrium earnings, and each of the three automated sellers
had earnings below their equilibrium earnings. This situation is typical as the regression
model below demonstrates.
Let ei be the ratio of the surplus earned by seller i to the equilibrium surplus for seller i,
and let e−i be the ratio of the surplus earned by all sellers other than i to the equilibrium
surplus for these other sellers. If the surplus in equilibrium is the same for each buyer
and each seller, the sum of the normalized performance measures ei − 1 is equal to the
market eﬃciency minus one. For the case of the experiment parameters in table 1, the
sum of the normalized performance measures is approximately zero provided the earned
surplus for each seller and buyer is positive. Consequently, a reasonable null hypothesis is
that the values of the performance measures are independent and identically distributed
on the set {e :
 12
i=1 ei − 1=0 }. In this case, if the coeﬃcients {ej : j ∈I B \{ i}} sumTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 30
Figure 10: Performance of sellers and buyers across 15 experiment periods.
to e−i then E[ei]=− 1
7 e−i. To test this hypothesis, we examine the regression model
ei − 1=α0 + α1(e−i − 1) +  i. Table 7 shows the results of this regression model for each
of the design treatments.
Treatment Type α0 α1 R2 F
Baseline Sellers -0.0259 1.1479 0.3506 238.6
Buyers 0.0005 0.7812 0.3066 195.4
Balanced Sellers -0.0072 0.9230 0.6578 2083
Buyers 0.0113 0.8267 0.4072 744.6
Automated Sellers 0.0016 0.9763 0.8725 3066
Sellers Buyers -0.0470 0.6186 0.1547 81.9
Automated Sellers -0.0188 0.8685 0.5194 386.9
Buyers Buyers 0.0090 0.9345 0.6913 801.6
Table 7: Performance correlation among sellers and among buyers.
Based on the results of these regressions, with all estimated slope coeﬃcients closer to
one than to −1
7, it is appropriate to model the relative performance of sellers to that of
buyers as a function of the distribution of types present in an individual experiment session.
This relative performance model is described and analyzed in the next subsection.THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 31
4.5 Relative performance model
This section develops and estimates a model of the relative performance of sellers and buyers.
The model treats relative performance as a function of the proﬁle of types present in each




where eS is the surplus attained by sellers divided by the equilibrium surplus of sellers, and
eB is deﬁned similarly.
Assume that relative performance is a function r(X)f r o mIR + to I R+ where X is a
random variable that is a measure of the relative pace of asks versus bids. In order to have
the function r(X) treat sellers and buyers symmetrically, if relative pace is inverted, relative
performance should be inverted: r(X−1)=r(X)−1. Functions of the form r(X)=Xγ have
this property for any γ ∈ I R.
Assume that the relative pace variable X has a lognormal distribution where X = eY
and Y ∼ N(µ,σ). Let B = {b1,b 2} and S = {s1,s 2} denote the two buyer and two seller
groups, and assume that for each seller group there is a random variable Ysj that measures
the pace of seller group j for j =1 , 2 and for each buyer group there is a random variable




j=1 Ysj. The underlying assumption in this model is that the
random variable X = eY that is a measure of relative pace is a function of contributions
from each of the two seller groups and each of the two buyer groups. Note that if Ysj and
Ybj have a common expectation, then the expected value of Y is zero, so that E[X]=1 ,i n
which case the relative performance of sellers and buyers is equal.
The regression model is
lnr(Xk)=α0 + αh sh + αa sa − βh bh − βa ba +  k (5)
where Xk is the relative pace of sellers to buyers in experiment session k. The variables
sh and sa indicate the number of human seller groups and the number of slow automated
seller groups present in a session, where each of these variables takes the value 0, 1, or 2 and
sh + sa ≤ 2. (The number of fast automated seller groups in a session is sf
a =2− sh − sa.)
Similarly, bh and ba are the number of human buyer and slow automated buyer groups. TheTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 32
negative sign on the buyer terms have been chosen so that the strength of seller and buyer
coeﬃcients can be compared directly, since the negative sign adjusts for the fact that strong
buyers have the opposite impact from strong sellers on the ratio of seller performance to
buyer performance.
Estimated coeﬃcients from the regression model are shown in table 8. The R2 statistic
is 0.6979, so that the model is capable of explaining a large fraction of the variability in
relative performance. The F statistic is F =3 0 .6, which has signiﬁcance at any reasonable
l e v e l( e . g . ,0 .001).
These coeﬃcients can be interpreted in both relative and absolute terms. In relative
terms, the presence of human sellers (sh > 0) has a detrimental eﬀect on the ratio of seller
surplus to buyer surplus, and this eﬀect is signiﬁcant. Human buyers have no eﬀect on the
relative performance statistic (since βh is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero); relatively,
they are stronger than human sellers. Slow automated buyers and slow automated sellers
have comparable eﬀects on performance. Finally, both human sellers and human buyers
are weaker than slow automated sellers or buyers. In the case of automated sellers, their
presence has a signiﬁcant positive impact on the relative performance of sellers. Human
buyers have a neutral impact, but slow automated buyers contribute negatively to the
relative performance of sellers. Consequently, slow automated buyers are stronger than
human buyers. In absolute terms, the expected change in relative surplus of sellers to
buyers is e−0.157 (approximately a 15.5% reduction) when one group of human buyers is
replaced by one group of slow automated buyers.
α0 αh αa βh βa
Estimate -0.003 -0.117 0.142 -0.001 0.157
SE 0.066 0.036 0.028 0.034 0.028
Table 8: Estimates for humans versus slow automated sellers and buyers.
In order to assess the impact of fast automated sellers and buyers, the regression equation
is presented in the alternative form
lnr(Xk)=α0 + αh sh + αa sf
a − βh bh − βa bf
a +  k (6)THE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 33
where sf
a and bf
a are the numbers of fast automated seller and fast automated buyer groups.




Estimate -0.028 -0.258 -0.142 -0.158 -0.157
SE 0.041 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.028
Table 9: Estimates for humans versus fast automated sellers and buyers.
The most important additional comparison in table 9 is between human buyers and
fast automated buyers. These coeﬃcients are similar, and both have small standard errors.
Consequently, the timing speciﬁcation for fast automated buyers yields performance that is
similar to human performance. Moreover, from the regression in equation (5) we know that
slow automated buyers outperform human buyers. Taken together these observations imply
that the performance of automated buyers improves as their pace decreases, when the pace
is speciﬁed so that automated buyers and human buyers have comparable performance.
These regressions demonstrate that, aggregated across experiment sessions, a substantial
proportion of the diﬀerence between the performance of sellers and buyers is explained by
the types present in the market. An alternative regression, which utilizes only the relative
performance from the ﬁnal trading period, leads to similar results. This is important, since
one possible scenario is that strategic behavior is important along the path to a competitive
equilibrium, but its importance diminishes once prices stabilize and the opportunity to
inﬂuence price reduces. All of the qualitative results noted above for the full data set are
obtained in the ﬁnal period as well, and the coeﬃcients are similar.
5 Conclusions
The notion of price taking behavior is strongly associated with competitive equilibrium, yet
this paper demonstrates that substantial deviations from equilibrium earnings are consistent
with the stable prices and approximate eﬃciency that are typical in double auction exper-
iments, and the deviations from equilibrium earnings are driven to a large extent by theTHE STRATEGIC IMPACT OF PACE IN BARGAINING 34
strategic impact of the pace of sellers’ asks and buyers’ bids. Strategic interaction among
sellers and buyers is a crucial element of the price discovery process, but it is surprising that
strategic considerations ﬁgure prominantly in the interactions of market participants after
low levels of price variability are attained. Once prices have stabilized, there is frequently a
clearly established bid-ask spread. Sellers and buyers vie with each other to inﬂuence the
market price, and consequently to improve relative performance. If, for example, sellers are
more likely to yield and accept the standing bid rather than wait until a buyer accepts the
standing ask, then the average price will decline. The cumulative eﬀect of these concessions
has a considerable eﬀect on relative performance, as demonstrated by the statistical model
in Section 4.5. Consequently, price taking behavior – which is virtually synonymous with
competitive equilibrium – is not implied by price stability and approximate eﬃciency, that
is, by approximate competitive equilibrium. Thus, there is a substantial role for strate-
gic behavior even under competitive outcomes, and this paper, through use of automated
strategies, demonstrates that the pace of sellers’ asks and buyers’ bids is a key element of
such strategic behavior in temporally unstructured bargaining.
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Appendix A
Proposition 1 Let b∗
k be the argmax of S(b)=( v − b)q(b)o n[ dk,d k+1), and let ˜ b∗
k be
the argmax of ˜ S(b)=( v − b)q(b)
1
n. Then (1) on each interval [dk,d k+1) the argmax ˜ b∗
k of
˜ S(b) is less than the argmax b∗
k of S(b), and (2) if ˜ S(˜ b∗




Proof If the slope of ˜ S(b) is negative at b∗
k then ˜ S(b) is increasing to the left of b∗
k.
Diﬀerentiate ˜ S(b)t og e t˜ S
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For all n>1, this expression is negative, so assertion (1) holds.

















Suppose that (v −˜ b∗
k)˜ q ∗
k > (v −˜ b∗
k−1)˜ q ∗
k−1.S i n c e˜ b∗
k−1 maximizes (v −b)˜ q(b)o n[ dk−1,d k),
(v −˜ b∗
k)˜ q ∗
k > (v − b∗
k−1)q ∗
k−1.A l s o ,q ∗
k > ˜ q ∗
k so (v −˜ b∗
k)q ∗
k − (v − b∗
k−1)q ∗
k−1 > 0. Then
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If the expression on the right side of equation (A.1) is positive, then
(v − b∗
k)(q ∗






k) > (v − b∗
k−1)q(b∗
k−1).












Choose α ∈ (0, 1) so that ˜ b∗
k = αb∗
k +( 1− α)b∗













. Then equation (A.3) is equivalent to
α>
(1 − β)β n
1 − β n+1 .
For all n ≥ 2 and for all β ∈ (0, 1), if α ≥ 1
n+1 then α>
(1−β)β n
1−β n+1 . Consequently, the claim






The ﬁrst-order condition for ˜ b∗
k is 1










 (˜ b ∗
k)
. The
value of v −˜ b∗
k is smallest for v = dk+1 so the value of q
 
(b) is largest at ˜ b∗
k when v = bk+1.
Therefore ˜ b∗
k takes on its smallest value in [dk,d k+1) when v = dk+1 so it is suﬃcient to
prove the assertion for this case. In this case, a direct calculation shows that ˜ b∗
k and b∗
k lie in
(0.607625dk+0.392375dk+1,d k+1). This calculation involves several steps. First, there is at
most one root of S
 
i (b)i n[ dk,d k+1), and there is one root if and only if q(dk) ≤ 11
27 q(dk+1).
In this case, the interior local maximum Si(b∗
k)a tb∗
k is greater than Si(dk) (which may be a
local maximum on [dk,d k+1)) if q(dk) ≤ 0.345615q(dk+1). For values of q(dk)a n dq(dk+1)
that satisfy this inequality, b∗
k > 0.607625dk +0 .392375dk+1.
Consequently, ˜ b∗
k > 1
3 dk + 1
3 dk+1.S i n c edk >b ∗





Finally, since dk+1 >b ∗
k, the claim that b∗
k > 1
3 b∗
k−1 + 2
3 b∗
k is veriﬁed.